• 4 min de lectura
• 4 min de lectura
The public debate on port development is very active among experts, but there are basic points on which there is broad consensus. The first and most important justification is to maintain regional leadership in the global supply chain.
Although Chancay is a reality, it makes no sense for the main economy on the west coast of South America to add another link to its foreign trade.
State policy must guarantee the availability of port infrastructure necessary to receive any container ship available in the maritime industry.
The solution then requires building a deep-water, sheltered terminal that can accommodate this type of vessel. There is a technical consensus, well-founded in rigorous studies, that the most efficient solution is the San Antonio Outer Port Project.
Two years ago, EPSA commissioned me to organize an Expert Panel, where we modeled over a hundred possible scenarios, resolving the conflict between the re-tendering of current infrastructure and the tendering of new infrastructure. Maintaining the competitive tension that brought so much good to our port development generated market interest and good offers from incumbents.
After that experience and being a privileged observer of these processes for decades, I have come to the conviction that the project cannot be the exclusive patrimony of EPSA. It is a country project.
A public-public partnership is necessary.
Valparaíso must link its destiny to its construction, by purchasing a part of the San Antonio Outer Port. Therefore, T1 must be the extension of Valparaíso's Tender: a great port asset to be tendered: ExTPS + T1. This is a complex option, but it provides a comprehensive solution, participating in the benefits of the concession and the risk of financing the shelter works.
EPSA will concession STI in the medium term, adding the concessions of Panul and and others, prioritizing service continuity and customer loyalty, making the end of this short concession coincide with the end of DP World's current concession. This creates a second major operator for all current San Antonio terminals, and the third major operator in the long term will be the one who tenders Terminal 2 of the Outer Port.
As strengths, this formula aligns the interest of Port Companies with the objective of the owner, the State of Chile. It balances short-term and long-term conflict by incorporating the continuity of current terminals into the offers to be received. It incentivizes investment in current terminals.
However, as weaknesses, it raises the difficult public-public alliance. It requires a report + TDLC, in addition to generating complex contract negotiations between port companies.
On the other hand, it also represents opportunities by sending a strong signal to the market about long-term public policy. More attractive proposals due to lower risk. Financial leverage between Port Companies does not require State guarantee for the shelter works of the San Antonio Outer Port. It reduces uncertainty with a balanced joint venture of port companies.
Nevertheless, there are also threats arising from possible unforeseen emerging conflicts in the design stage that require an agile dispute resolution mechanism. A complex solution to various interests, market shares, and limits that will have to be defended in the TDLC.
With this macro design, everyone has expectations of winning or losing, the ghost of dubious projects disappears, and Valparaíso becomes the main promoter of the project, which is the beginning of a cultural change.
I am among those who have always understood that public port projects belong to the country, and that companies are the specific managers of the State.
Now, in the case of projects that, like the Outer Port, go beyond the usual framework, undoubtedly more commitment of all kinds is required from all State agencies whose competencies are decisive for its progress. The nation requires the generosity and open-mindedness of all to find a design that allows it to become a reality.
