Published 14 October 2026
BIMCO’s Dry Bulk Cargo Network discussed three persistent safety challenges at its latest meeting: fire risks from contaminated scrap metal cargoes, the shift of fumigation duties from specialists to ships’ crews, and continuing fatalities in enclosed spaces.
Members highlighted the need for clearer cargo information, stronger charter party provisions, and practical measures to protect crews.
The eighth meeting of the BIMCO Dry Bulk Cargo Network was held on Thursday 8 October 2026 and covered the following agenda items:
Scrap metals had previously been discussed at the sixth meeting in early 2025, when views differed over whether the IMSBC Code schedule for scrap adequately covers the different types of scrap and the effects of contamination by materials such as plastics, tyres, and oils.
Self-heating and oxidation can increase the risk of fire, particularly when scrap is moved from outdoors storage, where drainage and ventilation are possible, into a cargo hold, where compaction can restrict both.
The sixth meeting acknowledged that the risk can be mitigated to some extent by:
However, this remains an issue, and BIMCO continues to receive member enquiries. These include questions about the meaning of “as dry as possible;” surveyors finding more plastics, tyres, oils and flammable material than the declared impurity percentage suggests; and the implications of lithium batteries being present, including whether this introduces dangerous goods considerations under Class 9 of the IMDG Code.
Network members were asked:
Are any changes needed to better address the risks associated with scrap cargoes?
Some members commented that the schedule itself is clear, but that problems arise at scrap yards and among shippers. These include confusion about the distinction between different scrap metal cargoes and how they should be described and classified, and a general lack of understanding of the hazards.
Members also called for authorities to publish reports on fires related to the carriage of scrap metal. Members reported concerns about an apparent increase in fires related to the carriage of scrap cargoes but noted that the lack of formal investigation reports makes it difficult for the industry to identify causes and develop effective solutions.
Any changes to the Group C schedule should address what materials may be mixed into scrap cargoes, whether the sorting and removal of unwanted materials is adequate, whether loading practices create additional risks, and how to ensure that the master receives the necessary information.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, travel and boarding restrictions sometimes prevented specialist fumigation contractors from sailing with vessels or boarding ships in port. As a result, some crews were asked to undertake activities normally carried out by specialists, including top-up fumigation and the removal of spent fumigant. This raised significant safety concerns, as IMO guidance generally envisages fumigants being handled only by qualified operators, and several serious accidents and fatalities have been linked to fumigation activities.
The Thorco Angela casualty is a documented example in which investigators concluded that COVID-19 restrictions likely prevented specialist fumigators from boarding and that the crew were not trained to deploy or remove the fumigant. Several other accidents and fatalities were documented during the pandemic. In one recent casualty review, symptoms were initially attributed to COVID-19 rather than phosphine exposure, delaying identification of the actual hazard.
Network members were asked whether, since the pandemic, they had observed operational responsibility for fumigated cargoes shifting from specialist service providers to ships’ crews. Of those able to answer:
Members were then asked which aspects of fumigation risk management are most commonly left to the ship’s crew after departure:
Other issues raised included obtaining a gas-free certificate, which can be difficult or impossible in some ports, and the safe disposal of fumigant sleeves by the crew.
In what was seen as a positive development, none of the network members present had encountered a flag State still approving ships’ crews to undertake fumigation activities in place of specialist contractors.
As time was short, the network held only a brief discussion on enclosed spaces to identify key topics for a future meeting. These include reading gas-detection meters, interpreting the results, and best practice for training and drills. Members noted that, despite greater awareness of enclosed-space risks and improved ability to assess atmospheres, accident and fatality statistics do not appear to be improving.
